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The Size of the Prize: 
Testing Rent-Dissipation when Transfer Quantity is Endogenous 
 
I. Introduction and Background 
The presence of rent-seeking in the government policy-making process has become 
generally recognized by economists.  The phenomenon of some or all of the value of a 
government transfer being spent on lobbying in pursuit of that transfer is termed rent-dissipation.  
Two questions are asked in this paper: to what extent can rent-seeking expenditures exceed the 
rents sought, i.e. cause so-called over-dissipation of rents, and to what extent does the relative 
lobbying effectiveness of the competing groups affect the outcome of rent-seeking competition? 
Following Tullock (1967, 1980), several theoretical models were developed to analyze 
how much lobbyists from competing groups spend to persuade the government to transfer a fixed 
prize (e.g., monopoly rights to one firm for selling a product) to their own groups.  Fixed-prize 
models predict that aggregate lobbying expenditures by risk-neutral, perfectly rational agents 
should not exceed the size of the prize;  i.e., rents should not be over-dissipated in equilibrium. 
A limitation of using Tullock-type fixed-prize models, however, is that in real-world 
political economies, groups lobby not only over who will pay for or receive a transfer, but also 
over how large that transfer will be.  That is, the size of the prize is often determined 
endogenously within the machinations of the political system.  This is clear in semi-annual 
debates over the federal U.S. farm bill, in which agriculturalists lobby for larger farm subsidies, 
and taxpayers’ groups lobby for lower farm subsidies.  Similarly, debate over defense spending 
is never about whether nothing should be spent on national defense, but always about how much 
should be spent.  Debates over tax policy are usually about how high taxes should be set, and not 
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transfer policies can be extremely responsive to political pressure from interest groups.  Recent 
examples are Case (2000), who shows that political competition determines the sizes of block 
grants in Albania, and Couch and Williams (1999), who show that political pressures affected 
how New Deal dollars were distributed by Alabama government during the Great Depression. 
Because of the ample evidence that in the real world the sizes of government transfers are 
determined endogenously within the lobbying system, it is worthwhile to examine the rent-
dissipation question with a model in which transfer size is endogenous.  We conduct such a 
theoretical analysis here, using as a basis Becker’s (1983) seminal model of transfers among 
political pressure groups.  It is curious that while Becker’s model has been cited hundreds of 
times in other branches of the political economy literature (recent examples are Sobel (1999), 
Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman (1997), and Jeong, Bullock, and Garcia (1999)), references to it 
are rare in the rent-dissipation literature.  Linking Becker-type and Tullock-type models to 
examine rent-dissipation is long overdue.  We show that a key theoretical result of linking these 
models is a prediction of over-dissipation, even under risk-neutrality and perfect rationality.  
This result contrasts sharply with theoretical results of Tullock-type fixed-prize models. 
Of course, economists would like to test empirically the merits of the various theoretical 
models of rent-dissipation.  Unfortunately, because much political activity involves time and 
effort (to conduct vote drives, send opinion letters to newspapers, etc.), but not monetary 
expenditures, observing and quantifying all expenditures used to influence government actions is 
often impossible.  Therefore conventional empirical analysis often is largely useless in the 
examination of rent-dissipation.  This makes rent-dissipation a natural subject of experimental 
economics.  Experimental tests based on Tullock-type fixed-prize models have found over-
dissipation, contrary to those models’ theoretical predictions.  Our experimental findings also 
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Unlike with fixed-prize models, however, our experimental findings are consistent with our 
model’s theoretical predictions.   
In a model with endogenously determined transfers, such as ours, there is an incentive for 
participants to engage in implicit cooperation in order to avoid a lose-lose equilibrium outcome, 
in which all parties engage in costly transfer-seeking activities, but the resulting transfer prize is 
very small or zero.  Many experimental tests of models with incentives for implicit (off-
equilibrium) cooperation have found strong evidence of such behavior.  See for example Fehr, 
Gächter, and Kirschsteiger [1997], and Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl, [1993], who analyze labor 
markets, or Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1996) for a test of the Prisoners’ Dilemma, 
which conceptually is much the same as our symmetric game.  There appears to be an element of 
trust in some economic games, which support off-equilibrium outcomes.  It is therefore 
particularly interesting that we find not only over-dissipation of rents, but also transfer-seeking 
expenditures that exceed the Nash equilibrium prediction, despite the presence of implicit 
cooperation incentives. 
In addition, our experimental findings confirm that policy outcomes based on rent 
seeking in asymmetric environments are biased in favor of the advantaged agent.  Nevertheless, 
disadvantaged agents appear to spend more aggressively than predicted, resulting in somewhat 
smaller transfers than predicted. 
 
II.  Rent-Seeking and Transfer-Seeking Models 
A.  Fixed-Prize Models 
1.  Theoretical Results in Fixed-Prize Models 
Hillman (1989, chapter 6) categorizes models of what he calls the resource cost of 
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over the prospect of winning and losing.  He distinguishes between models of rent-seeking and 
models of transfer-seeking.  In rent-seeking models all players compete to receive a fixed prize Q 
which is provided by exogenous sources, but in transfer-seeking models a subset of the players 
compete to receive the fixed prize Q while other players oppose the awarding of the prize, since 
they must pay for the prize that is awarded.  Hillman also distinguishes between what he calls 
perfectly discriminatory and imperfectly discriminatory models.  In perfectly discriminatory 
models, the winner(s) and loser(s) of the prize are determined with certainty by the amounts of 
lobbying expenditures made by each player.  In imperfectly discriminatory models players’ 
lobbying expenditures determine only each player’s probability of winning or losing. 
 Much attention has been paid in the theoretical and experimental rent-seeking literature to 
Tullock's (1980) imperfectly discriminatory rent-seeking game.  In this game, risk-neutral 
players bid (or make lobbying expenditures) for a prize worth a fixed amount of dollars, Q.  
Their bids affect their probabilities of winning the prize.  (See Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries 
(1994) or Hillman (1989, chapter 6) for excellent summaries of the structure of Tullock's game.) 
In Tullock (1980, 1984, 1985, 1987, 1989) and elsewhere in the literature, considerable effort 
has been spent on discussing the possibility of the over-dissipation of rents.   
Millner and Pratt (1989) claim that for certain parameterizations of the Tullock game 
over-dissipation in Nash equilibrium is possible, though in laboratory experiments they do not 
confirm this claim.  Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1994, Theorem 3, p.  373) respond by 
proving that Tullock's imperfectly discriminatory rent-seeking game with two risk-neutral 
players "never involves over-dissipation in any (possibly mixed-strategy) Nash equilibrium."  A 
similar point is made by Shogren and Baik (1991). 
Fabella's (1995) imperfectly discriminatory transfer-seeking model allows for the 
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number of transfer-seekers bid.  Fabella shows that in this case, again for risk-neutral players, 
over-dissipation of rents is still not possible.  Ellingsen (1991) analyzes both perfectly and 
imperfectly discriminatory transfer-seeking games, and also concludes that over-dissipation of 
rents is not possible in a Nash equilibrium of risk-neutral players in either scenario. 
 Thus, in the rent/transfer-seeking literature it has been shown that if the size of the prize 
is fixed, and players are risk-neutral, over-dissipation of rents in Nash equilibrium is not 
predicted, whether the game is perfectly or imperfectly discriminatory, and whether it is a rent-
seeking or a transfer-seeking game.   
 Hillman and Katz (1984) provide a fixed-prize imperfectly discriminatory model that 
allows players to be risk-averse.  Their model predicts that when the number of players is large 
and the size of the prize is small, rents will be slightly under-dissipated, and that the degree of 
rent-dissipation declines as the degree of risk aversion increases.  When the size of the prize is 
large, rents can be substantially under-dissipated.  Similarly, Hillman (1989) shows that allowing 
for the presence of risk-averse players decreases dissipation when the number of players 
approaches infinity.  In two-player games Millner and Pratt (1991) show that predictions depend 
on the third derivative of the utility function, such that predictions cannot be formed based on 
relative risk-attitudes alone.  
The only predictions of over-dissipation under conditions of fixed prizes and risk-
neutrality of which we are aware are in Anderson, Goeree and Holt (1996), and in Hillman and 
Riley (1989).  The prediction of Anderson, Goeree and Holt is based on a logit equilibrium that 
allows players to make decisions with errors.  Hillman and Riley (p. 36) briefly comment on the 
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2.  Experimental Results in Fixed-Prize Models 
 Millner and Pratt (1989) test behavior in games predicting under- dissipation for risk-
neutral players.  Using an imperfectly discriminatory model, they observe some instances of 
over-dissipation of rents, with average dissipation significantly above prediction but still less 
than complete.  Using a similar game, Shogren and Baik (1991) give subjects complete 
information about expected payoffs in a normal-form game and find that play is not significantly 
different from the risk-neutral  Nash equilibrium prediction.  Experimenting with an imperfectly 
discriminatory game, Schotter and Weigelt (1992) confirm the findings in Shogren and Baik 
(1991) that play is not significantly different from the risk- neutral Nash prediction.  But with a 
strongly asymmetric version of their game, where the cost to the disadvantaged agent is four 
times that of the advantaged agent, they observe agents either dropping out of the game, 
supplying zero effort, or spending more than the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium prediction.  No 
over-dissipation is observed on average. 
 Davis and Reilly (1995) conduct experiments evaluating each of six fixed-prize auction 
variants proposed by Ellingsen (1991).  They find dissipation to be greater in perfectly 
discriminatory games than in imperfectly discriminatory games (lotteries).  Davis and Reilly also 
find that dissipation is lower in a transfer-seeking game (one that incorporates rent-defending 
buyer) than in their baseline rent-seeking game, though in both games over-dissipation is the 
result. 
 Explanations for the experimental findings of over-dissipation in some of these fixed-
prize models are likely to be found in violations of the risk-neutrality or perfect rationality 
assumptions.  Following Hillman and Katz (1984) risk-loving behavior could lead to over-
dissipation.  Similarly, Anderson, Goeree and Holt (1996) show that relaxing the perfect 
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 In the next section we review a model which has not been previously tested and provides 
a theoretical prediction of over-dissipation of rents under conditions of risk-neutrality and perfect 
rationality.  We then describe a laboratory experiment that tests this model. 
 
 B.  The Becker Model 
Little attention has been paid in the rent- dissipation literature to another prominent 
model of transfer-seeking, formulated by Becker (1983, 1985).  In the Becker model lobbying 
expenditures affect the size and the direction of the transfer itself, such that the prize is not fixed 
but determined within the model’s game.  In both the Becker model and the models discussed in 
the previous section, the direction of the transfer (or, in imperfectly discriminatory models, the 
probability of the direction of the transfer) is determined endogenously.  But in the Becker model 
the size of the transfer itself is also determined endogenously.   
We will show that this endogeneity of the size of the prize brings about some interesting 
twists to the rent-dissipation literature.  Specifically, under certain very plausible 
parameterizations of the Becker model, the Nash equilibrium results in over- dissipation of rents.  
This result contrasts directly with the results of the fixed-prize model, be they rent- or transfer-
seeking, or perfectly or imperfectly discriminatory.  The intuition behind this result is that in the 
endogenous prize model it is possible for the lobbying efforts of one player to (even exactly) 
counterbalance the lobbying efforts of another.  The result is that the government taxes and 
subsidizes the players by only a small amount (or not at all).  If the government taxes and 
subsidizes little, the size of the transfer is small;  yet though the transfer is small, players lobby to 
defend themselves against other players’ lobbying.  Thus, more can be spent on lobbying than is 
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 Coggins (1995) also presents a Becker-type non-cooperative game in which players use 
lobbying expenditures to influence the price of a good.  Similar to the results we obtain, Coggins 
shows that the Nash equilibrium of his game can be characterized by over-dissipation of rents if 
players’ possess roughly symmetric degrees of political power and initial wealth.  Coggins 
concludes, "If it is true . . . that rational rent seekers never spend more in total than the value of 
the monopoly prize they seek, this paper has shown that the same cannot be said of rent seeking 
for a price policy."  Our model suggests that Coggins’ statement can be broadened, and that the 
pertinent issue here is not so much whether the players lobby for a monopoly prize or a price 
policy, but rather whether the size of the prize is fixed or depends on lobbying expenditures. 
Here we present a simplified version of the Becker model, which we used in our 
experiments.  In the model we have two players 1 and 2, each of whom is given an endowment 
of Ei and must choose a lobbying expenditure ai from some set of possible lobbying expenditure 
choices Ai  ˝ R+ (i = 1, 2).  Lobbying expenditures determine what Becker calls “political 
influence,” the absolute value of which we will call the “size of the government,” I = I(a1, a2).  
We say that if I > 0 player 1 is subsidized and player 2 is taxed to finance the subsidies, if I < 0 
player 1 is taxed and player 2 is subsidized, and that if I = 0 neither player is taxed or subsidized.   
Let Tri (i = 1, 2) represents transfers to/from player i (subsidy if positive, tax if negative).  
Deadweight and administration costs are assumed to accompany the taxation and subsidization 
processes.  Thus, the government is assumed to receive less than the taxed player pays, and the 
subsidized player is assumed to receive less than the government spends.  Furthermore, 
deadweight and administrative costs may grow with the size of government.  Formally, these 
conditions imply Tr1(a1, a2) = f(I(a1, a2)) and Tr2(a1, a2) = g(I(a1, a2)), where 0 < f¢ £ 1 for I ‡ 0, f¢ 






  -10  
 
 Assume that each player’s objective is to choose lobbying expenditures to maximize 




max  Ei+Tr i a1,a2 ( )-ai. (1) 
Define player 1’s set of best responses as B1 = {(a1, a2) ˛ A1·A2: a1 = 
1 a ˛A 1
argmax (E1 + 
Tr1(a1, a2) - a1)}.  Similarly, define player 2’s set of best responses as B2 = {(a1, a2) ˛ A1·A2:  a2 =  
argmax
a2 ˛A 2
(E2 + Tr2(a1, a2) - a2)}.  A necessary and sufficient condition for (a1, a2) to be a 
noncooperative Nash equilibrium is that (a1, a2) ˛ B1˙B2;  that is, a1 must solve (1) for i = 1 
given the value of a2, and a2 must solve (1) for i = 2 given the value of a1.1 
 
a.  Over-dissipation in the Becker Model 
If we assume a symmetric game2, then player 1’s set of best responses B1 is the 
transformation across the 45-degree line of player 2’s set of best responses B2.  (An illustration is 
provided in Figure 1.)  That is, (x, y) ˛ B1 if and only if (y, x) ˛ B2.  This implies that in a 
symmetric game if (a1, a2) is a pair of noncooperative Nash equilibrium lobbying expenditures, 
then a1 = a2.  But then (see (iv) in note 2) in equilibrium there is neither taxation nor 
subsidization of either group:  Tr1(a1, a2) = Tr2(a1, a2) = I(a1, a2) = 0.  Since lobbying expenditures 
are nonnegative and there are no rents in equilibrium, then there are two possibilities for an 
equilibrium degree of rent-dissipation for the symmetric model:  that positive lobbying 
expenditures are made (a1 = a2 > 0) but no transfers occur, implying over-dissipation, or that no 
lobbying expenditures are made and no transfers occur.3  Which of these two possibilities occurs 
will depend on the specifications of the symmetric model used.  Next we present an example of a 
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expenditures are positive, but neither taxes nor subsidies are generated (so rents are over-
dissipated). 
 
b.  A Symmetric Game 
In our experiments, we employ the following specification of influence: 
 
 I a1,a2 ( )=g1 a1 [ ]
e1-g 2 a2 [ ]
e2 , (2) 
where e1, e2, g1, and g2  are parameters describing the relative ability of interest groups to affect 
the "size of government" and the direction of transfers with their lobbying expenditures.  (We 
assume that 0 < e1 < 1, 0 < e2 < 1, in order to satisfy functional form requirements set forth in 
the appendix of Becker (1983).) 
We assume that deadweight costs accruing in both the taxation and subsidization 
processes are simply 10% of the "size of government": 
 
 
  1 Tr a1,a2 ( )= f I a 1,a2 ( ) ( )= I a 1,a2 ( ) - 0.1 ABS I a1,a2 ( ) [ ], (3) 
 
  2 Tr a1,a2 ( )= g I a1,a2 ( ) ( )= -I a1,a2 ( ) -0.1 ABS I a1,a2 ( ) [ ] , (4) 
 
Let Game 1 have specifications (1), (2), (3) and (4), with E1 = E2 = 10.  Assume in Game 
1 that each player’s lobbying expenditures can take on any nonnegative value (i.e., A1 = A2 = R+).  
Then in Game 1, the set of (a1, a2) representing player 1’s best-response a1 to lobbying 
expenditures of a2 by player 2 is shown in (5) for i = 1.  The set of (a1, a2) representing player 2’s 
best-response a2 to lobbying expenditures of a1 by player 1 is shown in (5) for i = 2.  (Note that 
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,  i, j = 1, 2, j „ i.   
Finally, we can make Game 1 symmetric by assuming e1 = e2 and g1 = g2.  In particular, 
we assume e1 = e2 = 0.5, and g1 = g2= 4.  The best-response sets for Game 1 can be obtained from 
(5), and are shown in Figure 1.  Note that the best-response sets intersect at all points between D 
and E, all of which lie on the 45-degree line and are not (0, 0).  Thus, in Game 1 any Nash 
equilibrium implies over-dissipation of rents. 
 
 c.  An Asymmetric Game 
  The symmetric Becker game described as Game 1 above can be made asymmetric simply 
by altering the assumptions that e1 = e2 and g1 = g2.  If, say, e1 < e2, or if g1 < g2, player 2 is 
politically stronger than player 1.  This changes the best-response functions for both players.  
We will specify Game 2 as an asymmetric game by setting e1 = 0.1, e2 = 0.5, and g1 = g2 = 4.  It 
can be shown that the Nash Equilibrium for this game is a1 = $0.402 and a2 = $3.24 resulting in a  
subsidy of $3.19 to player 2 and a tax of $3.90 on player 1.4  Thus, again, we have aggregate 
lobbying expenditures being greater than the size of the subsidy, so rents are over-dissipated.  
Because player 1 is less politically powerful than player 2, in equilibrium player 1 pays a tax to 
finance a subsidy to player 2.  Note also that in the asymmetric game the disadvantaged agent 
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are less effective at the margin.  As lobbying expenditures are not very effective for one player, 
the sum of lobbying expenditures is smaller in the asymmetric game than in the symmetric game.  
 
III. Experimental Design 
We implemented a transfer-seeking game much like Game 1 as a computerized one-shot 
normal form game in the experimental laboratory.  The only difference between Game 1 and the 
symmetric game in the laboratory was that in the experiment we offered the players only a finite 
number of lobbying expenditure choices; A1 = A2 = {$0.00, $0.50, $1.00, $2.00, $4.00, $6.00}.
5  
We chose this form of the game for two reasons.  First, we wanted a normal form game to mimic 
the conditions in Shogren and Baik (1991).  This serves as a conservative assumption giving the 
Nash equilibrium its best chance of not being rejected.  Second, the continuous version of the 
game shown in Figure 1 has multiple Nash equilibria, and although it may be interesting to study 
how agents coordinate behavior under conditions of multiple equilibria, this is not our principal 
purpose here.  We therefore constructed the discrete version of the game in such a way as to 
ensure a unique equilibrium.   
Corresponding to these discrete expenditure choices we calculated payoffs for each 
subject according to the objective functions in (1).  These were then presented to subjects in the 
form of matrices, as shown in Tables 1 and 2 for the symmetric and asymmetric game, 
respectively.  If subjects wanted to, they could also view matrices indicating the transfer amounts 
resulting from the expenditure choices, calculated in accordance with equations (3) and (4).  
(These matrices are shown in Appendix A.)  The concept of an influence function was never 
introduced to subjects, but they were told that the payoffs corresponded to the net of their initial 
endowment ($10), their spending decision, and the resulting transfers.  (A complete set of 
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separated by screens.  Each player’s computer terminal displayed both his/her own and the other 
player’s payoffs simultaneously, although no player knew the identity of the player with whom 
he or she was matched as we used an anonymous matching process.  Subjects were asked to 
make a choice over expenditures, displayed as row or column choices, that would result in 
specific transfers between themselves and the other player, and cause the payoffs shown in the 
matrix.  All subjects made their decisions simultaneously and anonymously.  The option of 
viewing the transfer matrices was activated with a simple keystroke. 
Table 1 shows the particular payoffs employed in our symmetric treatment together with 
the parameter values that generated them.  The Nash equilibrium in the symmetric game is found 
in column five, row five, corresponding to expenditures of $4.00 for each player, and a payoff of 
$6.00 for each.  This equilibrium is shown as point C in Figure 1.  Table 2 shows the 
corresponding payoffs for the asymmetric treatment.  The Nash equilibrium is at $0.50 
expenditures for the column player and $4.00 for the row player, with payoffs of $4.81 and 
$9.84, respectively.  (This equilibrium in discrete strategies corresponds to the continuous 
strategy equilibrium indicated earlier.)  For both of these games we predict over-dissipation of 
rents because the equilibrium subsidy is less than the combined rent-seeking costs. Subjects were 
given detailed instructions about the game on the computer screen as well as in hard copy.  As 
part of the on-screen instructions we also included a test of their ability to read the payoff and 
transfer matrices, and to relate these matrices to their decisions.  After all subjects had 
successfully finished the instructions and the test, they played the game for five training periods 
against different partners.  They were instructed that they would be paid only for their decisions 
in period six, and that they would play against a new, randomly selected partner in each period.  
In addition to the payoff from the game in period six, they also received a $5 participation fee 
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and actual periods, and subjects remained in the initial positions assigned, i.e., either as 
advantaged or disadvantaged.  The conditions in the training periods were therefore identical to 
the actual period, with the exception that subjects were not paid for the training periods’ play. 
 
IV.  Results 
Subjects were seventy graduate and undergraduate students from the College of Business 
at the University of South Carolina.  Twenty-eight of these participated in the symmetric 
treatment, and forty-two in the asymmetric treatment, twenty-one in each position.  Unless 
explicitly stated, all tests are performed on period six data only. 
Our symmetric game is a variation of the Prisoners’ Dilemma game.  Previous 
experimental tests of the Prisoners’ Dilemma game have found a fairly large proportion of 
cooperative play.  Cooper et al.  (1996), for example, found that at least 20% of players chose to 
cooperate in any particular period.  Out of our 28 subjects in the symmetric game, however, only 
one chose the $0 spending level, and only one other chose a positive spending which was less 
than the Nash Equilibrium prediction.  It is therefore straightforward to reject cooperative play in 
these games.  Nevertheless, we also reject the Nash Equilibrium in favor of overspending, as will 
be shown shortly.  This finding is particularly interesting as the equilibrium is supported by 
dominant strategies.  The test subjects went through before starting the training periods was 
intended to test if they understood how to read the payoff matrices.  We have no reason to 
suspect that subjects were lacking in this understanding. 
We reject normality for the distributions of expenditures, earnings and transfers using a 
Shapiro-Wilk test (see Shapiro and Wilk (1965)).
6 We therefore present our results based on a 
non-parametric sign test of the difference between the observed value and the predicted value.  
See Snedecor and Cochran (1989) for a discussion of this test.  Table 3 summarizes the results 
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We can very confidently reject the Nash Equilibrium predictions for all three variables.  As we 
can see, the median values for both the expenditures and the transfers confirm the predictions, 
but the mean values show higher expenditures, larger transfers, and smaller earnings than 
predicted.  Both expenditures and rents are above predictions, but these deviations cancel out 
such that rent-dissipation is not significantly different from predicted values. 
Figure 2 also shows the distribution corresponding to the Quantal Response Equilibrium 
(QRE) prediction.  We show the Quantal Response Equilibrium as an alternative prediction to 
the perfect rationality-based Nash Equilibrium.  This QR equilibrium concept was developed by 
McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) and allows for players that make decisions with errors.  Players are 
more likely to choose better strategies than worse ones, but are not restricted to do so with 
probability one.  In each case we reject the QRE using Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney ranksum tests.  
Nevertheless, a glance at the predicted distributions reveals that they appear closer to the 
observed behavior than do the Nash Equilibrium predictions. 
These results are consistent with the behavior observed in Millner and Pratt (1989) who 
found players spending more on (fixed-prize) rent-seeking than predicted by the risk-neutral 
Nash equilibrium.  Shogren and Baik (1991) found that this overspending disappeared, however, 
when subjects were presented with the game in normal form.  Despite our use of the normal 
form, our results are contrary to the findings in Shogren and Baik (1991).  Our findings are 
particularly interesting as we do not employ a fixed transfer-seeking prize.  In our case, subjects 
could easily see, from the payoff and transfer matrices, that rent-seeking may be a lose-lose 
game, leading to large expenditures for both players and no prize.  The incentives to engage in 
implicit cooperation should therefore have been quite strong in this case.  In fact, we observe 
several subjects who explored the set of smaller rent-seeking expenditure options during the 
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implicit cooperation as a plausible alternative hypothesis to the Nash Equilibrium prediction, we 
nevertheless reject it in favor of the NE.  In our symmetric game we both predict and find 
over-dissipation.  Over half of our subjects ended up with a zero prize, but positive expenditures.  
Nevertheless, we also reject the NE in favor of another alternative hypothesis, namely that of 
spending more.   
When we separately observe the behavior of the eleven subjects who spent more than the 
Nash prediction in period six, we notice that, as a group, they overspent in the training periods as 
well.  A sign test verifies that this spending is significantly higher than the Nash equilibrium 
spending.
7  During the training periods, this behavior lead to earnings that are significantly less 
than the Nash equilibrium earnings.
8  Thus, the overspending observed is not due to unusual 
experiences during training leading them to mistakenly believe that overspending may increase 
their earnings.  Rather, they overspent in the last period despite their earlier experiences. 
From our observations of the symmetric game we can then conclude that, despite the 
strong incentives to implicitly cooperate due to the endogenous-prize nature of the game, 
subjects not only over-dissipated, which is predicted in this case, but they also overspent 
compared to the Nash equilibrium prediction, and they did so at the price of significantly reduced 
earnings.  Although we can reject the QRE as an explanation to these observations, it is still 
interesting to observe that the general shape of the observed distribution looks similar to the one 
generated by the QRE.  Some of the overspending may therefore be explained by allowing for 
error terms in the decision making process. 
In the asymmetric games we reject that disadvantaged players were playing their Nash 
strategies, as is shown by our non-parametric tests in Table 4.  Expenditures were above 
prediction, leading to insignificantly smaller transfers, but earnings were only insignificantly 
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with the QRE prediction.  These results are consistent with Schotter and Weigelt (1992), who 
found that disadvantaged players in uneven tournaments (an institution resembling the perfectly 
discriminating auction) overbid compared to the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium prediction. 
For the advantaged players we cannot reject that their spending choices are the Nash 
strategies.  See Table 5 for summary statistics and tests and Figure 4 for the complete 
distribution along with the QRE prediction.  Transfers and earnings are both significantly less 
than the Nash prediction, so the spending behavior by disadvantaged players observed here did 
have a significant negative influence on advantaged player payoffs. 
In the symmetric game we could not reject the Nash Equilibrium prediction of over-
dissipation of rents.  In the asymmetric game, we predict less over-dissipation, but subjects’ 
behavior led to over-dissipation in excess of prediction.  This over-dissipation was still less than 
in the symmetric game, however.   
These results are consistent with the findings in Davis and Reilly (1995), who reported 
that with a fixed transfer-prize, the presence of a rent-defending buyer lead to fewer instances of 
successful transfer-seeking by sellers.  In our case, with an endogenously determined transfer-
prize, the spending behaviors by disadvantaged players resulted in smaller transfers received by 
advantaged players than predicted by the Nash equilibrium.  It is interesting to note that here, it 
is the absence of a response by advantaged players that made the overspending behavior by 
disadvantaged players successful. 
It may be hypothesized that this overspending behavior of disadvantaged players could 
result from them having spent less in the training periods than in the final period, causing 
advantaged players to form expectations of weak play.  But this does not appear to be the case.  
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difference is not significant and the medians are the same.  Figure 5 shows the distributions of 
expenditures by disadvantaged players in the training periods and in the final period. 
Despite the fact that disadvantaged agents spent more than predicted in the asymmetric 
game, we still find that disadvantaged agents spent significantly less than do agents in symmetric 
games.
9  We also find that due to lower expenditures by disadvantaged agents, aggregate 
rent-seeking expenditures also are significantly lower in asymmetric than in symmetric games.
10 
Disadvantaged agents’ overspending lowered the earnings of advantaged agents 
significantly, and therefore we can ask whether it is possible that advantaged agents ended up no 
better off than they would have been without the asymmetric influence.  To answer this question 
we compare earnings of symmetric agents to the earnings of advantaged agents.  We find that 
earnings were smaller than predicted for both symmetric and advantaged agents, but that 
earnings of the latter were still significantly higher than of the former.
11  It is therefore still 
preferable to be an advantaged agent in an asymmetric game than to face the equal competition 
of a symmetric game.   
In summary, we cannot reject over-dissipation in either of the two games investigated.  In 
fact, players in our experiments appear to spend even more on rent-seeking than predicted by the 
Nash Equilibrium, except when they are in an advantageous position. 
 
V.  Conclusions 
We have discussed a model that links the theory of Becker (1983, 1985) with Tullock-
type models of politically contestable rents.  Our model predicts over-dissipation of rents in a 
transfer-seeking game with an endogenous prize.  We have implemented an empirical test of this 
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A major theoretical thrust of our paper, as is indicated by its title, is its endogenization of 
transfer size in a model of rent-dissipation.  Making the size of the prize endogenous changes the 
focus of the rent-dissipation literature in a meaningful way, and brings some important insights 
not available from the fixed-prize literature.  For example, the endogenous-size model makes 
clear that in equilibrium there need not be a prize for there to be lobbying, or that large lobbying 
efforts can accompany small prizes.  Players’ large lobbying efforts over potential subsidies and 
taxes may balance each other out, such that in equilibrium the size of the prize is zero or quite 
small.  There has been almost no focus in the rent-dissipation literature on endogenous prize 
models, despite the useful insights that they provide, and despite that these models are widely 
used in other branches of the political economy literature.  We contend that the rent-dissipation 
branch of the literature has been too narrowly focused on Tullock’s original fixed-prize model, 
and that our paper helps unite the rent-dissipation literature with a very much related literature on 
lobbying expenditures and political pressure. 
Besides the inherent theoretical interest, a motivation behind our addressing the question 
of whether rents can be over-dissipated is that, with over-dissipation, even a very small 
government might be supported by a large rent-seeking sector.  To the extent that the rent-
seeking costs are social costs, the total costs of running government might be greatly 
underestimated in political economies with small governments if all of the rent-seeking costs are 
not considered.  Using the value of the rent as a measure of rent-seeking costs, as suggested by 
Krueger (1974) among others, would result in such underestimation. 
To summarize our experimental results, we confirm the existence of behavior that leads 
to over-dissipation of rents in games with both symmetric and asymmetric political power.  We 
also confirm the hypotheses that lowering the political power of one player can lead to smaller 
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Although our results are based on an endogenous transfer size, we confirm previous 
findings in examinations of fixed-prize models that many subjects spend more than predicted.  
This is somewhat surprising in light of the existence of dominant strategies in our experiment, 
and the presence of incentives for implicit cooperation, such as those found in Prisoners’ 
Dilemma games.  We find that while it did lead to larger transfers, this overspending had no 
significant effect on the degree of over-dissipation in symmetric games.  But the overspending 
did increase the extent of over-dissipation in asymmetric games.  Players do better in an 
advantaged position in asymmetric games than they do in symmetric games, consistent with 
predictions. 
Our interest in relative lobbying effectiveness across groups was also motivated by the 
existence of situations in which income or property distributions create equity concerns, and 
where the rent-seeking process serves as a substitute for market allocation processes.
12  The 
prevailing literature generally assumes that rent-seeking leads only to redistribution with no 
corresponding social welfare gain, and consequently that the entire rent-seeking cost is 
considered a social cost.  Nevertheless, it is possible that rent-seeking leads to social gains 
through improvements in allocative efficiency if the rent-seeking expenditures reflect the 
marginal valuations of the property or license being allocated.  If such a process leads to 
efficiency-enhancing redistribution, the rent-seeking expenditures should not be considered a 
social cost, since they simply serve as a substitute for a market allocation process.  The 
magnitudes of the rent-seeking costs are only a concern as far as they exceed the allocation costs 
of alternative, possibly market based, processes.  Nevertheless, in the case of asymmetry across 
interest groups, policy outcomes may not reflect the underlying distribution of values, and may 
therefore lead to inefficient allocations.  As our results indicate, however, the degree to which 
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Table 1:  Payoffs in Game 1.  
(Symmetric Game, with E1 = E2 = $10.00, e1 = e2 = 0.5, g1 = g2 = 4) 
Payoffs to column player (Player 1) = E1 + Tr1(a1, a2) - a1 . 
  a1 = $0.00  a1 = $0.50  a1 = $1.00  a1 = $2.00  a1 = $4.00  a1 = $6.00 
a2 = $0.00  $10.00  12.05  12.60  13.09  13.20  12.82 
a2 = $0.50  6.89  9.50  10.05  10.55  10.65  10.27 
a2 = $1.00  5.60  8.21  9.00  9.49  9.60  9.22 
a2 = $2.00  3.78  6.39  7.18  8.00  8.11  7.73 
a2 = $4.00  1.20  3.81  4.60  5.42  6.00  5.62 
a2 = $6.00  0.00  1.83  2.62  3.44  4.02  4.00 
 
Payoffs to row player (Player 2) = E2 + Tr2(a1, a2) - a2 
  a1 = $0.00  a1 = $0.50  a1 = $1.00  a1 = $2.00  a1 = $4.00  a1 = $6.00 
a2 = $0.00  $10.00  6.89  5.60  3.78  1.20  0 
a2 = $0.50  12.05  9.50  8.21  6.39  3.81  1.83 
a2 = $1.00  12.60  10.05  9.00  7.18  4.60  2.62 
a2 = $2.00  13.09  10.55  9.49  8.00  5.42  3.44 
a2 = $4.00  13.20  10.65  9.60  8.11  6.00  4.02 
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Table 2: Payoffs in Game 2. 
(Asymmetric Game, with E1 = E2 = $10.00, e1 = 0.1, e2 = 0.5, g1 = g2 = 4) 
 
Payoffs to column player (Player 1, the disadvantaged player) = E1 + Tr1(a1, a2) - a1 
  a1 = $0.00  a1 = $0.50  a1 = $1.00  a1 = $2.00  a1 = $4.00  a1 = $6.00 
a2 = $0.00  $10.00  12.86  12.60  11.86  10.14  8.31 
a2 = $0.50  6.89  10.31  10.05  9.31  7.59  5.76 
a2 = $1.00  5.60  9.21  9.00  8.26  6.54  4.71 
a2 = $2.00  3.78  7.38  7.18  6.49  4.83  3.04 
a2 = $4.00  1.20  4.81  4.60  3.92  2.25  0.46 
a2 = $6.00  0.00  2.83  2.62  1.94  1.00  0.00 
 
Payoffs to row player (Player 2, the advantaged player) = E2 + Tr2(a1, a2) - a2 
  a1 = $0.00  a1 = $0.50  a1 = $1.00  a1 = $2.00  a1 = $4.00  a1 = $6.00 
a2 = $0.00  $10.00  5.89  5.60  5.28  4.95  4.74 
a2 = $0.50  12.05  8.51  8.21  7.90  7.56  7.35 
a2 = $1.00  12.60  9.24  9.00  8.68  8.35  8.14 
a2 = $2.00  13.09  9.73  9.49  9.23  8.96  8.78 
a2 = $4.00  13.20  9.84  9.60  9.34  9.06  8.89 
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Notes: The Shapiro-Wilk test shows the significance level at which we can reject normality of the observed 
distribution.  The sign test is based on the hypothesis that the probability of a positive difference between the 
observed and the predicted choice is as likely as a negative difference, namely 0.5.  WMW is the Wilcoxon-Mann-
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Notes: The Shapiro-Wilk test shows the significance level at which we can reject normality of the observed 
distribution. The sign test is based on the hypothesis that the probability of a positive difference between the 
observed and the predicted choice is as likely as a negative difference, namely 0.5. WMW is the Wilcoxon-Mann-
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Notes: The Shapiro-Wilk test shows the significance level at which we can reject normality of the observed 
distribution. The sign test is based on the hypothesis that the probability of a positive difference between the 
observed and the predicted choice is as likely as a negative difference, namely 0.5. WMW is the Wilcoxon-Mann-
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Figure 2: Distributions of Observed Expenditure Choices and Quantal Response Equilibrium 





























Figure 3: Distributions of Observed Expenditure Choices and Quantal Response Equilibrium 
































Figure 4: Distributions of Observed Expenditure Choices and Quantal Response Equilibrium 
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APPENDIX A  
 Transfer Matrices 
Table A1:  Transfers in Game 1  
(Symmetric Game, with E1 = E2 = $10.00, e1 = e2 = 0.5, g1 = g2 = 4) 
Transfers to column player (Player 1) = Tr1(a1, a2) 
  a1 = $0.00  a1 = $0.50  a1 = $1.00  a1 = $2.00  a1 = $4.00  a1 = $6.00 
a2 = $0.00  $0.00  2.55  3.60  5.09  7.20  8.82 
a2 = $0.50  -3.11  0.00  1.05  2.55  4.65  6.27 
a2 = $1.00  -4.40  -1.29  0.00  1.49  3.60  5.22 
a2 = $2.00  -6.22  -3.11  -1.82  0.00  2.11  3.73 
a2 = $4.00  -8.80  -5.69  -4.40  -2.58  0.00  1.62 
a2 = $6.00  -10.00  -7.67  -6.38  -4.56  -1.98  0.00 
Transfers to row player (Player 2) = Tr2(a1, a2) 
  a1 = $0.00  a1 = $0.50  a1 = $1.00  a1 = $2.00  a1 = $4.00  a1 = $6.00 
a2 = $0.00  $0.00  -3.11  -4.40  -6.22  -8.80  -10.00 
a2 = $0.50  2.55  0.00  -1.29  -3.11  -5.69  -7.67 
a2 = $1.00  3.60  1.05  0.00  -1.82  -4.40  -6.38 
a2 = $2.00  5.09  2.55  1.49  0.00  -2.58  -4.56 
a2 = $4.00  7.20  4.65  3.60  2.11  0.00  -1.98 
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Table A2:  Transfers in Game 2 
(Asymmetric Game, with E1 = E2 = $10.00, e1 = 0.1, e2 = 0.5, g1 = g2 = 4) 
 
Transfers to column player (Player 1, the disadvantaged player) = Tr1(a1, a2) 
  a1 = $0.00  a1 = $0.50  a1 = $1.00  a1 = $2.00  a1 = $4.00  a1 = $6.00 
a2 = $0.00  $0.00  3.36  3.60  3.86  4.14  4.31 
a2 = $0.50  -3.11  0.81  1.05  1.31  1.59  1.76 
a2 = $1.00  -4.40  -0.29  0.00  0.26  0.54  0.71 
a2 = $2.00  -6.22  -2.12  -1.82  -1.51  -1.17  -0.96 
a2 = $4.00  -8.80  -4.69  -4.40  -4.08  -3.75  -3.54 
a2 = $6.00  -10.00  -6.67  -6.38  -6.06  -5.00  -4.00 
 
Payoffs to row player (Player 2, the advantaged player) = E2 + Tr2(a1, a2) - a2 
  a1 = $0.00  a1 = $0.50  a1 = $1.00  a1 = $2.00  a1 = $4.00  a1 = $6.00 
a2 = $0.00  $0.00  -4.11  -4.40  -4.72  -5.05  -5.26 
a2 = $0.50  2.55  -0.99  -1.29  -1.60  -1.94  -2.15 
a2 = $1.00  3.60  0.24  0.00  -0.32  -0.65  -0.86 
a2 = $2.00  5.09  1.73  1.49  1.23  0.96  0.78 
a2 = $4.00  7.20  3.84  3.60  3.34  3.06  2.89 
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APPENDIX B  
 Experimental Instructions for Symmetric Game 
The following pages are reproductions of parts of the instructions you will be given on the 
computer screen.  You might want to refer to them during the course of the experiment.   
 
 PLEASE DO NOT START UNTIL THE 
 EXPERIMENTER ASKS YOU TO. 
 





 PRINT "                    EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS        " 
 PRINT 
 PRINT "     This is an experiment in economic decision making.  By" 
 PRINT "participating you will have a chance to earn a substantial amount" 
 PRINT "of money depending on your own and others decisions in this" 
 PRINT "experiment.  In addition to earnings related to decisions we will" 
 PRINT "also give you a participation fee.  Your record sheet will indicate" 
 PRINT "how large this fee is.  Funding for this experiment has been provided by" 
 PRINT "various research foundations." 
 PRINT 
 PRINT "     Make sure to keep a record of your earnings throughout the" 
 PRINT "experiment to compare to the experimenters records at the end of" 
 PRINT "the experiment.  A record sheet is included in the instruction" 






 PRINT "     In this experiment, you will enter all your decisions into" 
 PRINT "your computer terminal, and all your results will be displayed to" 
 PRINT "you on your computer screen.  If you are unfamiliar with the use of" 
 PRINT "a computer keyboard, please ask the experimenter for assistance.  No" 
 PRINT "particular computer experience is necessary for today's task." 
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 PRINT "      We ask that you do not talk or in any other way communicate" 
 PRINT "with any other participants during the course of the experiment.  If" 
 PRINT "you have questions please call for the experimenter's attention and" 





 PRINT "                                           " 
 
 PRINT "     In this experiment we are going to go through a sequence of 5" 
 PRINT "training decisions followed by a decision you will be paid for.  In" 
 PRINT "every decision period (every period requires one decision) you will" 
 PRINT "be paired with a different person in the room, but you will not be" 
 PRINT "told with whom you are paired.  These pairings are done randomly by the" 
 PRINT "computer.  Your earnings following the final decision will depend on" 
 PRINT "the other player's decision, as well as on your own." 
 PRINT "" 
 PRINT "    Your decision in the experiment will concern how much money to" 
 PRINT "spend on a process that will result in transfer payments between" 
 PRINT "you and the other player.  The process is such that the more you" 
 PRINT "spend in relation to the other player, the more transfers you will" 
 PRINT "receive from him or her.  If the other player spends more than you," 





 PRINT "     In every period, each of you will be given an initial" 
 PRINT "endowment of ten dollars that can be used to spend on the process" 
 PRINT "and/or to pay transfer payments.  In the training periods we never" 
 PRINT "pay the endowment, it is only hypothetical.  You will be paid in the" 
 PRINT "final period only." 
 
 PRINT "     The initial endowment is the same for all players, and is also" 
 PRINT "the same across each period.  The effect that spendings have on" 
 PRINT "transfers is also the same across all players, independent of" 
 PRINT "what position you are assigned.  Positions are identified as either" 
 PRINT "choosing among columns or among rows in tables that contain the" 
 PRINT "transfer payments and payoffs.  These tables will be explained to" 
 PRINT "you shortly.   
 
 PRINT "     All positions were assigned to computer stations in advance, and" 
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 PRINT "difference across positions will be obvious to you from the" 
 PRINT "information you are given on the computer screen during the experiment." 
 PRINT "We will show an example of this below.  Each period is identical to any" 
 PRINT "other period, except that you will not be playing against the same" 






 PRINT "     There are only two possible positions in the experiment" 
 PRINT "today, and they will always play against each other in each period." 
 PRINT "This means that even though the actual person you play against" 
 PRINT "changes, the payoffs relevant to both you and the person you are" 
 PRINT "playing against stay the same across periods.  " 
 PRINT "The payoffs are calculated as:" 
 PRINT "" 
 PRINT "     Initial endowment of $10.00" 
 PRINT "-    spending" 





 If you are a column player 
 
 PRINT "     You will be asked to choose a column from a table such as" 
 PRINT "the one just shown.  Your choice only concerns which column to pick" 
 PRINT "and you can see how much spendings each column corresponds to as" 
 PRINT "that is indicated as exp  .  For example, the first column" 
 PRINT "corresponds to zero spendings (exp  0.0), and the second column" 
 PRINT "to 50 cents spendings (exp  0.50).  Your own payoffs will always be" 
 PRINT "shown in the lower of the tables." 
 PRINT "     The other player will always pick rows.  " 
 PRINT "     At the time when you make your decision you will not know what" 
 PRINT "decision the other player has made.  You will not be told your payoffs" 
 PRINT "in a period until both you and the other player have finished entering" 
 PRINT "your decisions." 
 PRINT 
 PRINT 
 PRINT "    In addition to these payoffs you will also be able to view" 
 PRINT "which transfers result from the spendings you and the other player" 
 PRINT "might choose.  Recall that the payoffs are calculated as:" 
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 PRINT "     Initial endowment of $10.00" 
 PRINT "-    spending" 
 PRINT "+/-  transfer payment" 
 PRINT 
 PRINT "     The transfer payments received by one player will always be" 
 PRINT "less than the transfers paid by the other player, so some money is" 





If you are a row player 
 
 PRINT 
 PRINT "     You will be asked to choose a row from a table such as" 
 PRINT "the one just shown.  Your choice only concerns which row to pick" 
 PRINT "and you can see how much spendings each row corresponds to as" 
 PRINT "that is indicated as exp  .  For example, the first row" 
 PRINT "corresponds to zero spendings (exp  0.0), and the second row" 
 PRINT "to 50 cents spendings (exp  0.50).  Your own payoffs will always be" 
 PRINT "shown in the lower of the tables." 
 PRINT "     The other player will always pick columns.  " 
 PRINT "     At the time when you make your decision you will not know what" 
 PRINT "decision the other player has made.  You will not be told your payoffs" 
 PRINT "in a period until both you and the other player have finished entering" 
 PRINT "your decisions." 
 PRINT 
 PRINT "    In addition to these payoffs you will also be able to view" 
 PRINT "which transfers result from the spendings you and the other player" 
 PRINT "might choose.  Recall that the payoffs are calculated as:" 
 PRINT "" 
 PRINT "     Initial endowment of $10.00" 
 PRINT "-    spending" 
 PRINT "+/-  transfer payment" 
 PRINT 
 PRINT "     The transfer payments received by one player will always be" 
 PRINT "less than the transfers paid by the other player, so some money is" 
 PRINT "lost in the transfer process." 
 PRINT 
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 PRINT "     The sequencing in the experiment is as follows:" 
 PRINT "" 
 PRINT "1) the period opens" 
 PRINT 
 PRINT "2) you are shown your and the other player's payoff table." 
 PRINT 
 PRINT "3) you can move back and forth between viewing the payoffs and" 
 PRINT "viewing the transfers" 
 PRINT 
 PRINT "4) you enter your decision (and so does the other player)." 
 PRINT 
 PRINT "5) the period ends and you are told your payoffs as well as the" 
 PRINT "decision made by the other player" 
 PRINT 
 PRINT "6) the next period opens, where you play against a new person" 
 PRINT " " 
 PRINT "    We will start the experiment with five training periods.  They" 
 PRINT "will be performed just like the real period, except that you will" 
 PRINT "NOT be paid according to the outcome in these periods.  You will" 
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Notes 
                                                                 
1.  Of course, in the very general form of the model presented so far, existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium 
is not assured.  These may be assured by imposing appropriate structure on the functions and on the sets of possible 
lobbying expenditures A1 and A2. 
2.  More formally, a symmetric game is one in which (i) E1 = E2, (ii) A1 = A2, (iii) g(I)= f(-I)for all I ˛ R, and (iv) I(x, 
y) = -I(y, x) for any (x, y) in A1·A2.  That is, for players 1 and 2 endowments are equal, choice sets are the same, the 
relationship between deadweight loss and the amount transferred to either player is the same, and switching 
lobbying expenditures of the groups reverses the direction of transfer but does not affect the size of government. 
3.  It should be emphasized that symmetry in the Becker game is not a necessary condition for over-dissipation in 
noncooperative Nash equilibrium.  One can easily imagine an asymmetric game which is in some sense not “too 
asymmetric,” so that in equilibrium transfers are not zero, yet still are smaller than the sum of lobbying 
expenditures.  One of the games we present has these properties. 
4   Strictly speaking, in Game 2 player 2 is politically stronger than player 1 in the neighborhood of the Nash 
equilibrium.  (When expenditures a1 and a2 are both less than $1.00, the functional form of I(a1, a2) in Game 2 
implies that player 2 can be weaker than player 1.) 
5. The games used in our experimental design have dominant strategies.  As is evidenced by the best-response curves 
in Figure 1, not all Becker-type games have dominant strategies.  In our experimental design we have chosen games 
with dominant strategies in an effort to conduct a very ”clean“ test, for if subjects do not play the Nash Equilibrium 
even when there are dominant strategies, something other than perfect expected payoff maximization must be 
driving behavior.  So, the dominant strategies model is conservative in that among all Becker-type models it is 
biased away from rejecting the theory. 
6. We reject the null hypothesis that the data follows a normal distribution at any significance level higher than 
0.00038. 
7. Sign test probability = 0.0365. 
8. Median earnings for these 11 subjects during the 5 training rounds was $5.60.  The sign test probability for the 
comparison to predicted earnings of $6 is 0.0094. 
9. Median expenditures are $4 in the symmetric game and $1 for disadvantaged players in the asymmetric game.  
WMW ranksum test rejects equality (prob=0.0000). 
10. Average expenditures are $4.57 in the symmetric and $2.56 in the asymmetric game.  WMW ranksum test rejects 
equality (prob=0.0001). 
11. Median earnings in the symmetric game are $5.62 and for advantage agents in the asymmetric game they are 
$9.23.  WMW ranksum test rejects equality (prob=0.0000) 
12. Obviously, anything other than a utilitarian social welfare function would also imply that redistribution affects 
social welfare, even when allocative efficiency is unaffected.  We focus here only on the efficiency aspects of social 
welfare, however. 